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In a wo r ld o f c o m p le t e m a r ke t s wit h we ll-fu n c t io n in g ¯ n a n c ia l m a r ke t s , t h e r e is n o r o o m fo r
a t h e o r y o f in c e n t ive s . Co m p e t it io n a n d b a n kr u p t c y m e c h a n is m s e n s u r e t h a t a g e n t s h a ve t h e
in c e n t ive s o f p e r fo r m in g t o t h e ir b e s t o f kn o wle d g e a n d a b ilit ie s . Th e r e a r e , h o we ve r , m a n y
in s t a n c e s wh e r e m a r ke t s a r e a b s e n t . Fo r e xa m p le , p r o d u c t io n b y t h e p u b lic s e c t o r is o ft e n
n o t s o ld o r s o ld m o n o p o lis t ic a lly. L o n g -t e r m r e la t io n s h ip s b e t we e n a s u p p lie r a n d a ¯ r m
o ft e n in vo lve t h e p r o d u c t io n o f a r e la t io n -s p e c i¯ c g o o d , a n d c o m p e t it io n c a n n o t d is c ip lin e
t h e s u p p lie r . W it h in a ¯ r m , t r a n s a c t io n s a r e u s u a lly n o t e xp o s e d t o e xt e r n a l c o m p e t it io n .
In a ll t h e s e c a s e s , o t h e r t yp e s o f in c e n t ive m e c h a n is m s m u s t b e d e s ig n e d t o m o t iva t e a g e n t s .
A g o o d p a r t o f t h e c o n t r a c t t h e o r y lit e r a t u r e d e a ls wit h t h e p r o vis io n o f in c e n t ive s in
t h e s e c a s e s . Th is lit e r a t u r e , h o we ve r , o ft e n lo o ks a t in c e n t ive s in a n u t s h e ll, ig n o r in g t h a t
s o m e fo r m o f e n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n c a n b e c r e a t e d wh e n t h e r e a r e m o r e t h a n o n e p r o je c t
in vo lve d . Fo r e xa m p le , To yo t a is r e n o wn e d fo r u s in g d u a l-s o u r c in g wh e n d e a lin g wit h s u p p li-
e r s t o g e n e r a t e s o m e fo r m o f c o m p e t it io n b e t we e n t h e m . It t h e n s e e m s im p o r t a n t t o b e t t e r
u n d e r s t a n d h o w a n d wh e n s u c h e n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n c a n b e u s e d t o p r o vid e in c e n t ive s .
E n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n m a y h a ve b e n e ¯ t s in p r o vid in g in c e n t ive s : a g e n t s a r e h ig h ly m o -
t iva t e d in p e r fo r m in g b e t t e r t h a n t h e ir \ r iva ls ." Th e r e a r e h o we ve r , c o s t s t o g e n e r a t in g s u c h
c o m p e t it io n . W h e n u s in g t wo o r m o r e a g e n t s , t h e r e m a y b e c o s t s t h a t a r e d u p lic a t e d , t h u s
c r e a t in g a n in e ± c ie n c y t h a t m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e p r in c ip a l. H ig h e r -p o we r e d in c e n t ive s
b a s e d o n c o m p e t it io n m u s t t h e n b e we ig h t e d a g a in s t d u p lic a t io n c o s t s .
In t h is p a p e r , we a n a lyz e t h e p r o b le m o f p r o vid in g in c e n t ive s wh e n t h e r e a r e m o r e t h a n
o n e p r o je c t . A p r in c ip a l h a s a c c e s s t o t wo ( p o s s ib ly c o r r e la t e d ) p r o je c t s wh ic h a r e m a n -
a g e d b y a s in g le a g e n t . B e fo r e u n d e r t a kin g a p r o je c t , t h e a g e n t -m a n a g e r c a n s p e n d s o m e
r e s o u r c e s t o in ve s t ig a t e it s qu a lit y, n a m e ly it s p r o b a b ilit y o f s u c c e s s . On ly p r o je c t s wit h a
h ig h p r o b a b ilit y o f s u c c e s s a r e p r o ¯ t a b le , a n d t h e r e fo r e s h o u ld b e in ve s t e d in . Th e r e a r e
t wo c la s s e s o f s t r a t e g ie s . Fir s t , t h e m a n a g e r m a y in ve s t ig a t e o n ly o n e p r o je c t t o s a ve o n
in ve s t ig a t io n c o s t s , b u t s t ill u s e t h e a c qu ir e d in fo r m a t io n t o m a ke a n in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n
o n t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . S e c o n d , t h e m a n a g e r c o u ld in ve s t ig a t e b o t h p r o je c t s , a n d
m a ke t h e in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n b a s e d o n t h e a c qu ir e d in fo r m a t io n o n e a c h p r o je c t . Co m p a r in g
t h e s e t wo s t r a t e g ie s , it wo u ld s e e m t h a t t h e m o r e c o r r e la t e d a r e t h e p r o je c t s , t h e b e t t e r it
is t o in ve s t ig a t e o n ly o n e p r o je c t a n d u s e t h e a c qu ir e d in fo r m a t io n t o le a r n a b o u t t h e o t h e r
p r o je c t . A n d , wh e n c o r r e la t io n is lo w, b o t h p r o je c t s s h o u ld b e in ve s t ig a t e d .
1Th e r e is , h o we ve r , a t h ir d s t r a t e g y t h a t t h e p r in c ip a l c o u ld u s e . H e c o u ld h ir e t wo a g e n t s ,
e a c h m a n a g in g o n e p r o je c t . B y m a kin g e a c h a g e n t 's c o m p e n s a t io n d e p e n d e n t o n t h e o u t c o m e
o f t h e p r o je c t o f t h e o t h e r a g e n t , t h e p r in c ip a l c r e a t e s s o m e fo r m o f c o m p e t it io n b e t we e n
t h e m . It wo u ld s e e m t h a t s u c h c o m p e t it io n wo u ld b e m o r e in c e n t ive wh e n p r o je c t s a r e h ig h ly
c o r r e la t e d . S o , in t u it ive ly, it is n o t o b vio u s t o kn o w wh e n e n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n s h o u ld
b e u s e d . W h e n p r o je c t s a r e h ig h ly c o r r e la t e d , e n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n p r o vid e s in c e n t ive s
b u t d u p lic a t e in ve s t ig a t io n c o s t s , wh ile h a vin g o n e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t
e xp lo it s in fo r m a t io n a l e c o n o m ie s o f s c a le b y e c o n o m iz in g o n in ve s t ig a t io n c o s t s , b u t d o e s n o t
a lwa ys yie ld t h e b e s t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s in c e in fo r m a t io n o n t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t
is n o t p e r fe c t .
W e e xa m in e t h e is s u e o f t h e o p t im a l o r g a n iz a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e fo r t wo p r o je c t s u n d e r
t h e a s s u m p t io n o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n . W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n is
p r iva t e t o t h e m a n a g e r ( m o r a l h a z a r d ) , a s we ll a s t h e in fo r m a t io n o b t a in e d d o in g s o ( a d ve r s e
s e le c t io n ) . W e t h e n s h o w t h a t t h e o p t im a l s t r u c t u r e d e p e n d s , a m o n g o t h e r t h in g s , o n t h e
d e g r e e o f c o r r e la t io n b e t we e n t h e r e t u r n s o f t h e t wo p r o je c t s . In g e n e r a l, d e le g a t in g t o o n e
m a n a g e r a n d in ve s t ig a t in g b o t h p r o je c t s is o p t im a l wh e n t h e p r o je c t s a r e we a kly c o r r e la t e d ;
d e le g a t in g t o t wo m a n a g e r s is o p t im a l fo r in t e r m e d ia t e va lu e s o f t h e c o r r e la t io n c o e ± c ie n t ,
wh ile d e le g a t in g t o o n e m a n a g e r a n d in ve s t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t m a y b e o p t im a l wh e n
p r o je c t s a r e s t r o n g ly c o r r e la t e d , d e p e n d in g o n p a r a m e t e r va lu e s . W e s h o w t h a t , fo r s o m e
p a r a m e t e r va lu e s , it m a y n e ve r b e o p t im a l t o d e le g a t e t o o n e m a n a g e r a n d in ve s t ig a t e o n ly
o n e p r o je c t , a n d t h is e ve n wh e n p r o je c t s a r e p e r fe c t ly c o r r e la t e d . E n d o g e n o u s c o m p e t it io n
is t h e n o p t im a l a s it m in im iz e s t h e c o s t o f p r o vid in g in c e n t ive s t o t h e m a n a g e r s , e ve n t h o u g h
in ve s t ig a t io n c o s t s a r e d u p lic a t e d . In t h a t c a s e , d e le g a t in g t o t wo m a n a g e r s b e c o m e s o p t im a l
fo r in t e r m e d ia t e a n d h ig h va lu e s o f t h e c o r r e la t io n c o e ± c ie n t .
2 T he model
A p r in c ip a l h a s a c c e s s t o t wo in d ivis ib le r is ky p r o je c t s wh o s e in ve s t m e n t c o s t is I. E a c h
p r o je c t c a n e it h e r b e s u c c e s s fu l a n d e a r n R, o r fa il a n d e a r n 0 . Th e r e a r e t wo t yp e s o f
p r o je c t s . A va lu a b le p r o je c t is s u c c e s s fu l wit h p r o b a b ilit y ¼, wh ile a b a d p r o je c t is s u c c e s s fu l
wit h p r o b a b ilit y ¼ < ¼. W e a s s u m e t h a t ¼R > I a n d ¼R < I, s o t h a t it is o n ly p r o ¯ t a b le t o
in ve s t in va lu a b le p r o je c t s . Th e r e t u r n fr o m n o t in ve s t in g in a p r o je c t is I. B e fo r e in ve s t in g
in a p r o je c t o r n o t , it is p o s s ib le t o in ve s t ig a t e a p r o je c t a t c o s t c > 0 . S u c h in ve s t ig a t io n
2yie ld s a p e r fe c t s ig n a l o n p r o b a b ilit y o f s u c c e s s o f t h e p r o je c t , t h a t is , t h e s ig n a l is ¼ if t h e
p r o je c t is va lu a b le , a n d t h e s ig n a l is ¼ if t h e p r o je c t is b a d . Th e p r o b a b ilit y t h a t a p r o je c t
is va lu a b le is P. W e a s s u m e t h a t
P¼R + ( 1 ¡P) I ¡ c > m a xfI;P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼Rg;
wh ic h im p lie s t h a t it is e ± c ie n t t o in ve s t ig a t e a p r o je c t fo r m a kin g t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t
d e c is io n , r a t h e r t h a n n o t in ve s t ig a t e a n d n o t in ve s t o r in ve s t b lin d ly.1
Th e t yp e s o f t h e t wo p r o je c t s a r e c o r r e la t e d . Th e jo in t d is t r ib u t io n fo r t h e t yp e s o f t h e
t wo p r o je c t s is g ive n in t h e fo llo win g t a b le .
1 n 2 ¼ ¼
¼ P 2 + k P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k [P]
¼ ( 1 ¡P) P ¡ k ( 1 ¡P) 2 + k [1 ¡ P]
[P] [1 ¡ P]
Th e p a r a m e t e r k r e p r e s e n t s a n in d e x o f c o r r e la t io n . W h e n k = 0 , t h e t yp e s o f t h e t wo
p r o je c t s a r e d is t r ib u t e d in d e p e n d e n t ly. W h e n k = P( 1 ¡ P) , t h e t yp e s o f t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a r e p e r fe c t ly c o r r e la t e d . W e a s s u m e t h a t 0 · k · P( 1 ¡P) , t h a t is , we a s s u m e t h a t p r o je c t s
a r e p o s it ive ly c o r r e la t e d , wh ic h s e e m s t o b e t h e n a t u r a l a s s u m p t io n . ( Th e c a s e o f n e g a t ive
c o r r e la t io n c o u ld b e a n a lyz e d u s in g t h e a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d b e lo w.) Ma r g in a l p r o b a b ilit ie s a r e
g ive n in s qu a r e b r a c ke t s in t h e t a b le .
Th e p r in c ip a l p a ys fo r t h e in ve s t m e n t I in e a c h p r o je c t a n d d e le g a t e s it s m a n a g e m e n t t o
a n a g e n t . Th e a g e n t is t h e n r e s p o n s ib le fo r in ve s t ig a t in g t h e p r o je c t o r n o t , a n d d e c id in g
wh e t h e r t o in ve s t in it o r n o t . W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r in c ip a l a n d t h e a g e n t ( s ) a r e r is k n e u t r a l,
t h a t t h e r e s e r va t io n va lu e o f t h e a g e n t is 0 , a n d t h a t t h e a g e n t h a s lim it e d lia b ilit y in t h a t
s h e c a n n o t b e p a id a n e g a t ive wa g e .
W e c o n s id e r t wo d i®e r e n t o r g a n iz a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e s fo r m a n a g in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s . Fir s t ,
t h e p r in c ip a l c a n h ir e t h e s a m e m a n a g e r fo r t h e t wo p r o je c t s . In t h is c a s e , t h e t im in g is a s
fo llo ws .
1 . Th e p r in c ip a l p r o p o s e s a c o n t r a c t t o t h e m a n a g e r . If it is r e je c t e d , b o t h e a r n 0 .
1The basic set-up is an adaptation of a model proposed by Nier (1997) to which we add a correlation
factor between projects.
32 . If it is a c c e p t e d , t h e p r in c ip a l g ive s 2 I t o t h e m a n a g e r .
3 . Th e m a n a g e r t h e n d e c id e s wh ic h p r o je c t s t o in ve s t ig a t e t o le a r n t h e ir t yp e . S h e b e a r s
a p e r s o n a l c o s t o f c p e r in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t .
4 . Give n t h e s ig n a ls o b t a in e d fo llo win g h e r in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n , t h e m a n a g e r m a ke s a n
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n fo r e a c h p r o je c t .
5 . Th e r e t u r n s a r e r e a liz e d a n d a c c r u e t o t h e p r in c ip a l. Th e m a n a g e r is r e m u n e r a t e d
a c c o r d in g t o t h e c o n t r a c t .
Th e fo r m o f t h e c o n t r a c t p r o p o s e d b y t h e p r in c ip a l d e p e n d s o n in fo r m a t io n a l a s s u m p t io n s
wh ic h we in t r o d u c e la t e r . N o t e t h a t t h e m a n a g e r d o e s n o t h a ve t o m a ke t h e s a m e in ve s t i-
g a t io n a n d in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s o n t h e t wo p r o je c t s .
In a s e c o n d o r g a n iz a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e , t h e p r in c ip a l c a n h ir e t wo d i®e r e n t m a n a g e r s , o n e
fo r e a c h p r o je c t . In t h a t c a s e , t h e t im in g is a s fo llo ws .
1 . Th e p r in c ip a l p r o p o s e s a c o n t r a c t t o e a c h m a n a g e r . If it is r e je c t e d , b o t h e a r n 0 .
2 . If it is a c c e p t e d , t h e p r in c ip a l g ive s I t o e a c h m a n a g e r .
3 . E a c h m a n a g e r t h e n d e c id e s wh e t h e r t o in ve s t ig a t e h e r p r o je c t o r n o t a t a p e r s o n a l c o s t
o f c.
4 . Give n t h e s ig n a l o b t a in e d fo llo win g h e r in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n , e a c h m a n a g e r m a ke s a n
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n fo r h e r p r o je c t .
5 . Th e r e t u r n s a r e r e a liz e d a n d a c c r u e t o t h e p r in c ip a l. E a c h m a n a g e r is r e m u n e r a t e d
a c c o r d in g t o t h e c o n t r a c t .
W e ¯ r s t a s s e s s t h e r e la t ive e ± c ie n c y o f t h e s e t wo s t r u c t u r e s u n d e r t h e a s s u m p t io n t h a t
t h e in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n a n d t h e s ig n a l it p r o vid e s a r e o b s e r va b le t o t h e p r in c ip a l. Th is
yie ld s a b e n c h m a r k fo r t h e m o r e in t e r e s t in g c a s e o f a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n , t h a t is , wh e n
t h e in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n a n d t h e s ig n a l it p r o vid e s a r e p r iva t e in fo r m a t io n t o t h e a g e n t ( s ) .
43 Symmetr ic infor mation
Fir s t , we a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r in c ip a l h ir e s o n ly o n e m a n a g e r fo r t h e t wo p r o je c t s . S u p p o s e
t h a t t wo p r o je c t s a r e in ve s t ig a t e d . Give n o u r a s s u m p t io n s , it is t h e n e ± c ie n t t o in ve s t in a
p r o je c t if a n d o n ly if it s s ig n a l is ¼. Ca ll s u c h s t r a t e g y d¤. Th e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t fr o m d¤ is
¦ ( d
¤;k) ¡ 2 c ´ 2 ( P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) I ¡c) :
N o t e t h a t t h is p r o ¯ t is in d e p e n d e n t o f t h e c o r r e la t io n fa c t o r k.
S u p p o s e n o w t h a t o n ly o n e p r o je c t is in ve s t ig a t e d . On t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , t h e
e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n is t o in ve s t if a n d o n ly if t h e s ig n a l is ¼. On t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d
p r o je c t , t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n d e p e n d s o n it s u p d a t e d va lu e wh e n u s in g t h e s ig n a l
o b t a in e d o n t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . Th is u p d a t e d e p e n d s , a m o n g o t h e r t h in g s o n t h e d e g r e e
o f c o r r e la t io n k. Th e r e a r e t h r e e p o s s ib le c a s e s : ¯ r s t , m a ke t h e s a m e in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n o n
b o t h p r o je c t s ( s t r a t e g y e d1) ; s e c o n d , a lwa ys in ve s t in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t ( s t r a t e g y
e d2) ; a n d t h ir d , n e ve r in ve s t in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t ( s t r a t e g y e d3) . Th e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t
fr o m t h e s e s t r a t e g ie s is , r e s p e c t ive ly:
¦ ( e d1;k) ¡ c ´
³
P¼ + ( P
2 + k) ¼ + ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ¼
´
R + ( 1 ¡ P) 2 I ¡c;
¦ ( e d2;k) ¡ c ´ P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) I + P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼R ¡c;
¦ ( e d3;k) ¡ c ´ P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) I + I ¡ c:
It is e a s y t o s h o w t h a t
¦ ( e d1;0 ) < m a x
n
¦ ( e d2;0 ) ;¦ ( e d3;0 )
o
a n d t h a t
¦ ( e d1;P( 1 ¡ P) ) > m a x
n
¦ ( e d2;P( 1 ¡ P) ) ;¦ ( e d3;P( 1 ¡ P) )
o
:
W h e n p r o je c t s a r e in d e p e n d e n t , h a vin g t h e s a m e in ve s t m e n t s t r a t e g y fo r b o t h p r o je c t s is
n e ve r o p t im a l. W h e n p r o je c t s a r e p e r fe c t ly c o r r e la t e d , h a vin g t h e s a m e in ve s t m e n t s t r a t e g y
is a lwa ys o p t im a l. N o t e t h a t ¦ ( e d2;k) a n d ¦ ( e d3;k) a r e in d e p e n d e n t o f t h e c o r r e la t io n fa c t o r
5k. Th e s t r a t e g y e d2 is p r e fe r r e d t o s t r a t e g y e d3 if a n d o n ly if b lin d ly in ve s t in g is b e t t e r t h a n
n o t in ve s t in g , t h a t is , if a n d o n ly if P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼R > I.
W e c a n n o w a s s e s s wh e t h e r it is b e t t e r t o in ve s t ig a t e o n e p r o je c t o r t wo . It is e a s y t o s e e
t h a t ¦ ( d¤;k) > m a x
n
¦ ( e d2;k) ;¦ ( e d3;k)
o
b e c a u s e o f t h e a s s u m p t io n t h a t in ve s t ig a t in g a n d
in ve s t in g e ± c ie n t ly is b e t t e r t h a n n o t in ve s t ig a t in g a n d in ve s t in g b lin d ly o r n o t in ve s t in g . It
t h e n r e m a in s t o c o m p a r e s t r a t e g y d¤ t o s t r a t e g y e d1. A c o n ve n ie n t wa y t o r e wr it e ¦ ( e d1;k) is
¦ ( e d1;k) ¡ c = 2 ( P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) I) ¡ c ¡ ( P( 1 ¡P) ¡k) ( ¼ ¡ ¼) R;
wh e r e t h e la s t t e r m r e p r e s e n t s t h e lo s s o f o n ly in ve s t ig a t in g o n e p r o je c t a n d in ve s t in g in b o t h .
N o t e t h a t t h is lo s s va n is h e s a s c o r r e la t io n b e c o m e s p e r fe c t , t h a t is , wh e n k = P( 1 ¡ P) . It
is e a s y t o s h o w t h a t
¦ ( e d1;k
¤) ¡ c = ¦ ( d
¤;k
¤) ¡ 2 c wh e r e k
¤ = P( 1 ¡P) ¡
c
R( ¼ ¡ ¼)
:
Th is im p lie s t h a t s t r a t e g y e d1 is o p t im a l if a n d o n ly if k ¸ k¤, a n d s t r a t e g y d¤ is o p t im a l fo r
k · k¤.
S e c o n d , s u p p o s e t h a t t h e p r in c ip a l h ir e s t wo m a n a g e r s , o n e p e r p r o je c t . Give n o u r
a s s u m p t io n s , it is e ± c ie n t fo r e a c h m a n a g e r t o in ve s t ig a t e h e r p r o je c t a n d in ve s t if a n d o n ly
if t h e s ig n a l is ¼. Ca ll s u c h s t r a t e g y b d. Th e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t fr o m b d is
¦ ( b d;k) ¡2 c ´ 2 ( P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) I ¡ c) :
N o t e t h a t t h is p r o ¯ t is in d e p e n d e n t o f t h e c o r r e la t io n fa c t o r k, a n d is e qu iva le n t t o ¦ ( d¤;k) ¡
2 c.
In a wo r ld o f p e r fe c t in fo r m a t io n , t h e p r in c ip a l c a n e a s ily im p le m e n t t h e ¯ r s t -b e s t s t r a t e g y
fo r a ll va lu e s o f k. Fir s t , t h e p r in c ip a l h ir e s a m a n a g e r . If k · k¤, t h e p r in c ip a l p a ys h e r
a c o n s t a n t wa g e 2 c if s h e fo llo ws t h e s t r a t e g y d¤, a n d 0 o t h e r wis e . If k > k¤, t h e p r in c ip a l
p a ys h e r a c o n s t a n t wa g e c if s h e fo llo ws t h e s t r a t e g y e d, a n d 0 o t h e r wis e . N o t e t h a t it is
n e c e s s a r y t o p a y t h e m a n a g e r a p o s it ive wa g e t o c o ve r fo r h e r p e r s o n a l in ve s t ig a t io n c o s t
c p e r in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . In b o t h c a s e s , t h e m a n a g e r h a s in c e n t ive s t o fo llo w t h e ¯ r s t -
b e s t s t r a t e g y. S u c h c o n t r a c t is fe a s ib le s in c e a ll d e c is io n s a n d s ig n a ls a r e a s s u m e d t o b e
o b s e r va b le a n d ve r i¯ a b le . Fu r t h e r m o r e , it is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o h ir e t wo m a n a g e r s . Th e ¯ r s t -
b e s t a llo c a t io n c a n b e a t t a in e d wit h o n ly o n e m a n a g e r a n d a n a p p r o p r ia t e c o n t r a c t . W e n o w
m o ve t o t h e m o r e in t e r e s t in g c a s e wh e r e in fo r m a t io n is in c o m p le t e .
64 Asymmetr ic infor mation
W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r in c ip a l c a n n o t o b s e r ve wh e t h e r t h e m a n a g e r h a s in ve s t ig a t e d a p r o je c t
o r n o t , a n d if s h e h a s , wh a t is t h e va lu e o f t h e s ig n a l. Ou t p u t is , h o we ve r , a s s u m e d t o b e
o b s e r va b le a n d ve r i¯ a b le . S in c e 0 < I < R, t h e p r in c ip a l c a n in fe r wh e t h e r t h e m a n a g e r
h a s in ve s t e d in t h e r is ky p r o je c t o r n o t . Ou r m o d e l is o n e o f m o r a l h a z a r d ( t h e in ve s t ig a -
t io n d e c is io n ) a n d h id d e n in fo r m a t io n ( t h e va lu e o f t h e s ig n a l) . W e ¯ r s t a s s u m e t h a t o n e
m a n a g e r is in c h a r g e o f b o t h p r o je c t s , a n d we e va lu a t e t h e e ± c ie n c y o f t h e s t r a t e g ie s d¤,
e d1, e d2, a n d e d3. W e kn o w wh e n e a c h o f t h e s e s t r a t e g ie s is o p t im a l u n d e r s ym m e t r ic in fo r -
m a t io n . W it h a s ym m e t r ic in fo r m a t io n , h o we ve r , in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s m a y a lt e r t h e r a n kin g
o f t h e s e s t r a t e g ie s . It is , t h e r e fo r e , n e c e s s a r y t o r e -e va lu a t e e a c h s t r a t e g y u n d e r a s ym m e t r ic
in fo r m a t io n .2
4.1 H ir ing one manager
In t h is e n vir o n m e n t , a r e m u n e r a t io n c o n t r a c t is a wa g e s c h e d u le t h a t is c o n d it io n a l o n
t h e o b s e r ve d o u t p u t . Th e r e a r e s ix d i®e r e n t o u t c o m e s d e p e n d in g o n in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s
a n d wh e t h e r a n in ve s t e d p r o je c t is s u c c e s s fu l o r n o t . Th e s e o u t c o m e s a r e d e n o t e d zs wit h
zs 2 f2 R;R;R + I;I;2 I;0 g. A wa g e p r o ¯ le is t h e n a ve c t o r fw( zs) g.3
4.1.1 I mplementation of the str ategy d¤
Th e p r in c ip a l wa n t s t o m in im iz e t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e o f t h e m a n a g e r s u b je c t t o h e r p a r t ic i-
p a t io n c o n s t r a in t a n d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s d e s ig n e d t o in d u c e t h e m a n a g e r in im p le m e n t in g
s t r a t e g y d¤. R e m e m b e r t h a t u n d e r s t r a t e g y d¤, t h e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a n d in ve s t s o n ly wh e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le ( ¼) . Th e e xp e c t e d wa g e is










2We assume here that it is optimal for the principal to implement either one of the ¯rst-best strategies.
We later compare them to simpler strategies and provide conditions for these ¯rst-best strategies to be
second-best optimal.
3Since the two projects are ex ante identical and the principal cannot observe investigation decisions,
there is no loss of generality in assuming that wages are function of only the sum of the returns of the two
projects.
72 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
³
( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
w( 2 I) :
W e n o w d e s c r ib e a ll c o n s t r a in t s t h a t m u s t b e s a t is ¯ e d fo r a c o n t r a c t t o im p le m e n t s t r a t e g y
d¤. Fir s t , t h e m a n a g e r 's p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t m u s t b e s a t is ¯ e d .
E d¤( w( zs) ) ¡ 2 c ¸ 0 ( 1 )
S e c o n d , t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s a r e im p le m e n t e d b y s a t is fyin g a s e t o f in c e n t ive
c o n s t r a in t s . Th e r e a r e fo u r p o s s ib le c o m b in a t io n s o f s ig n a ls t h a t t h e m a n a g e r c a n o b t a in ,
t h a t is , s h e c a n b e e it h e r o n e o f fo u r t yp e s : ( ¼;¼) ;( ¼;¼) ;( ¼;¼) ;( ¼;¼) . W e c o n s id e r in t u r n
in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s fo r t h e s e fo u r t yp e s .
² T he signal s on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t s ar e ( ¼;¼) .
W h e n b o t h s ig n a ls a r e fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . H e r e x-
p e c t e d wa g e fo r d o in g s o m u s t b e a t le a s t a s la r g e a s t h a t fr o m n o t in ve s t in g in a n y p r o je c t
o r in ve s t in g in o n ly o n e . Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o t h e fo llo win g c o n s t r a in t s .
¼
2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 ) ¸ w( 2 I) ( 2 )
¼
2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 ) ¸ ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ( 3 )
² T he signal s on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t s ar e ( ¼;¼) o r ( ¼;¼) .
W h e n o n e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le a n d t h e o t h e r o n e is n o t , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d
in in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t wit h t h e g o o d s ig n a l, r a t h e r t h a n n o t in ve s t in g a t a ll, o r
in ve s t in g in t h e b a d p r o je c t , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h p r o je c t s . W e t h e n h a ve t h e fo llo win g
in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ¸ w( 2 I) ( 4 )
¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ¸ ¼w( I + R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ( 5 )
¼w( R+I) +( 1 ¡¼) w( I) ¸ ¼¼w( 2 R) +( ¼( 1 ¡¼) +( 1 ¡¼) ¼) w( R) +( 1 ¡¼) ( 1 ¡¼) w( 0 ) ( 6 )
² T he signal s on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t s ar e ( ¼;¼) .
8W h e n b o t h s ig n a ls a r e u n fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld n o t in ve s t , r a t h e r t h a n in ve s t in
o n e p r o je c t , o r in ve s t in b o t h .
w( 2 I) ¸ ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ( 7 )
w( 2 I) ¸ ¼
2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 ) ( 8 )
W e n o t e t h a t e qu a t io n ( 2 ) is s a t is ¯ e d wh e n e qu a t io n s ( 3 ) a n d ( 4 ) a r e , a n d t h a t e qu a t io n ( 5 )
is s a t is ¯ e d wh e n e qu a t io n s ( 4 ) a n d ( 7 ) a r e .
Th ir d , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in in ve s t ig a t in g b o t h p r o je c t s . W e t h e r e fo r e h a ve
t o s p e c ify in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s fo r t h e in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n .
² Disc our aging no invest igat ion.
Th e m a n a g e r h a s t o p r e fe r t o in ve s t ig a t e t h e t wo p r o je c t s r a t h e r t h a n n o n e a n d n o t
in ve s t , in ve s t in o n e o f t h e p r o je c t s , o r in ve s t in b o t h . Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o t h e fo llo win g
in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
E d¤( w( zs) ) ¡ 2 c ¸ w( 2 I) ( 9 )
E d¤( w( zs) ) ¡ 2 c ¸ ( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼) w( R + I) + ( P( 1 ¡ ¼) + ( 1 ¡ P) ( 1 ¡ ¼) ) w( I) ( 1 0 )






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 1 1 )
2 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼ + ¼( 1 ¡¼) ) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
³




2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
Th e m a n a g e r 's p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t ( 1 ) is s a t is ¯ e d wh e n e qu a t io n ( 9 ) a n d t h e lim it e d -
lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t o n w( 2 I) a r e s a t is ¯ e d .
² Disc our aging invest igat ing onl y one pr ojec t .
W h e n t h e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s o n ly o n e p r o je c t , s h e g e t s o n ly o n e s ig n a l. Co n d it io n a l o n
t h a t s ig n a l, s h e a lwa ys in ve s t s o p t im a lly in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t if t h e in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s
o n t h e in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s a r e s a t is ¯ e d . On t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , h o we ve r , s h e c a n
e it h e r n o t in ve s t r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a l o n t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , in ve s t o n ly wh e n s h e
g e t s a n u n fa vo r a b le s ig n a l o n t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , in ve s t o n ly wh e n s h e g e t s a fa vo r a b le
9s ig n a l o n t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je t , o r a lwa ys in ve s t r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a l. Th is yie ld s t h e
fo llo win g fo u r in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
E d¤( w( zs) ) ¡ 2 c ¸ P ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) + ( 1 ¡ P) w( 2 I) ¡ c ( 1 2 )
E d¤( w( zs) ) ¡ 2 c ¸
³
P
2 + k + 2 ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k)
´





( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) ¡c






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 1 4 )
( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
( 1 ¡ P) w( 2 I) ¡ c






2w( 2 R) + 2 ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 1 5 )
( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ( 1 ¡¼) ¼ + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
³
( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
( ¼w( I + R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) ¡c
Fin a lly, we a s s u m e t h a t t h e m a n a g e r h a s lim it e d lia b ilit y, t h a t is , w( zs) ¸ 0 fo r a ll zs.
Th e p r in c ip a l's p r o b le m is t o m in im iz e E d¤( w( zs) ) s u b je c t t o c o n s t r a in t s ( 1 ) t o ( 1 5 ) , a n d
t o lim it e d -lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t s . A ¯ r s t le m m a s h o ws t h a t wd¤( 0 ) = wd¤( I) = wd¤( R) = 0 ,
t h a t is , t h e p r in c ip a l \ p u n is h e s " t h e m a n a g e r e ve r y t im e o n e o f t h e p r o je c t fa ils .
Lemma 1 The manager is punished each time a project fails, that is,
wd¤( 0 ) = wd¤( I) = wd¤( R) = 0 :
Th e in t u it io n fo r t h e p r o o f is s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d : if o n e o f t h e s e wa g e s wa s p o s it ive , it wo u ld
a lwa ys b e p o s s ib le t o r e d u c e it t o z e r o a n d t o in c r e a s e w( 2 R) o r w( R + I) , wh ile ke e p in g
t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t c o n s t a n t a n d r e la xin g s o m e o f t h e c o n s t r a in t s . Th is is p o s s ib le
b e c a u s e a va lu a b le p r o je c t h a s le s s p r o b a b ilit y o f fa ilin g t h a n a b a d o n e . It is h a r d t o
p r o vid e a c o m p le t e c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n o f t h e wa g e s n e c e s s a r y t o im p le m e n t s t r a t e g y d¤. W e
c a n , h o we ve r , g ive s o m e lim it in g r e s u lt s .
1 0P r oposition 1 (i) F or k su± ciently near zero, the optimal wage schedule is characterized
by
wd¤( 2 R) =
2 c( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼)
( ¼ ¡¼) ( ¼2A( 2 B + PC) + ¼¼( AC + 2 B( B + PC) ) + ¼2C( B + PC) )
;
wd¤( R + I) =
2 c( A¼2 + 2 B¼¼ + C¼2)
( ¼ ¡¼) ( ¼2A( 2 B + PC) + ¼¼( AC + 2 B( B + PC) ) + ¼2C( B + PC) )
;
wd¤( 2 I) =
2 c( A¼2 + 2 B¼¼ + C¼2) ( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼)
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( ¼2A( 2 B + PC) + ¼¼( AC + 2 B( B + PC) ) + ¼2C( B + PC) )
;
the expected pro¯t is
¦ ( d
¤;k) ¡
2 c( A¼2( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼) + ( A¼2 + 2 B¼¼ + C¼2) ( 2 B¼ + P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼) )
( ¼ ¡¼) ( ¼2A( 2 B + PC) + ¼¼( AC + 2 B( B + PC) ) + ¼2C( B + PC) )
;
where A = P2 + k, B = P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k, and C = ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k.
(ii) The cost of implementing strategy d¤ tends to in¯nity as k tends to P( 1 ¡P) .
W h e n k is n e a r z e r o , o n ly c o n s t r a in t s ( 9 ) , ( 1 0 ) , a n d ( 1 1 ) a r e b in d in g . S o lvin g fo r t h e t h r e e
r e m a in in g wa g e s yie ld s t h e c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n in t h e p r o p o s it io n . Th e e xp e c t e d p r o ¯ t is g ive n
b y t h e e xp e c t e d r e ve n u e o f t h e p r in c ip a l m in u s t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e . N o t e t h a t t h e c o e ± c ie n t
o f 2 c is g r e a t e r t h a n o n e , wh ic h im p lie s t h a t t h e m a n a g e r e a r n s s o m e in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s .
W h e n k is n e a r P( 1 ¡ P) , t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e g e t s ve r y la r g e a s it b e c o m e s in c r e a s in g ly
c o s t ly t o fo r c e t h e m a n a g e r t o in ve s t ig a t e b o t h p r o je c t s r a t h e r t h a n o n ly o n e , i.e ., c o n s t r a in t
( 1 4 ) b e c o m e s in c r e a s in g ly c o s t ly t o s a t is fy. U n fo r t u n a t e ly, fo r in t e r m e d ia t e va lu e s o f k, it is
n o t p o s s ib le t o p r o vid e a m o r e c o m p le t e c h a r a c t e r iz a t io n . N u m e r ic a l s im u la t io n s s h o w t h a t
t h e r e a r e m a n y d i®e r e n t c o m b in a t io n s o f c o n s t r a in t s t h a t c a n b in d d e p e n d in g o n p a r a m e t e r
va lu e s .
4.1.2 I mplementation of the str ategy e d1
Th e p r in c ip a l wa n t s t o m in im iz e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t s t o t h e m a n a g e r s u b je c t t o h e r
p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t a n d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s d e s ig n e d t o in d u c e t h e m a n a g e r in c h o o s in g
1 1s t r a t e g y e d1. U n d e r s t r a t e g y e d1, t h e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s o n ly o n e p r o je c t a n d in ve s t s in b o t h
wh e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le ( ¼) . Th e e xp e c t e d wa g e is






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 1 ¡P) w( 2 I) +
( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) ) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡¼) w( 0 ) ) :
Th e ¯ r s t t h in g t o n o t e is t h a t t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e is in d e p e n d e n t o f w( R+I) a n d w( I) . Th is
is b e c a u s e t h e s t r a t e g y e d1 n e ve r c a lls fo r o n ly o n e p r o je c t t o b e in ve s t e d in . It is t h e r e fo r e
o p t im a l t o s e t t h e m t o z e r o . Ta kin g t h is in t o a c c o u n t , we n o w d e s c r ib e a ll c o n s t r a in t s t h a t
m u s t b e im p o s e d o n t h e o p t im a l wa g e s c h e d u le fo r a c o n t r a c t t o im p le m e n t s t r a t e g y e d1.
Fir s t , t h e m a n a g e r 's p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t m u s t b e s a t is ¯ e d .
E e d1( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ 0 ( 1 6 )
S e c o n d t h e m a n a g e r m u s t m a ke t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n c o n d it io n a l o n t h e s ig n a l
s h e o b t a in s fr o m h e r in ve s t ig a t io n . Th e r e a r e t wo p o s s ib le s ig n a ls : ¼ a n d ¼.
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . Th is s h o u ld
b e p r e fe r r e d t o n o t in ve s t a t a ll, in ve s t o n ly in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , o r in ve s t o n ly in t h e
n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . Th e s e la s t t wo c o n s t r a in t s a r e n o t b in d in g g ive n t h a t w( R + I) =









( ¼w( 2 R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) ) + ( 1 7 )
Ã
P 2 + k
P
( 1 ¡ ¼) +
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
P
( 1 ¡ ¼)
!
( ¼w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) ¸ w( 2 I)
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is n o t fa vo r a b le , t h e o p t im a l s t r a t e g y c a lls fo r t h e m a n a g e r n o t t o in ve s t
a t a ll. Th is s h o u ld b e p r e fe r r e d t o o n ly in ve s t in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , t o in ve s t o n ly in
t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d o n e , o r t o in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . Th e o n ly p o s s ib ly b in d in g in c e n t ive
c o n s t r a in t is t h e la s t o n e .
w( 2 I) ¸ ¼
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k
1 ¡ P
¼ +





w( 2 R) + ( 1 8 )
1 2Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼ + ( 1 ¡¼) ¼) + 2
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡P
( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼)
!
w( R) +
( 1 ¡ ¼)
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( 1 ¡ ¼) +
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
( 1 ¡ ¼)
!
w( 0 )
Th ir d , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in in ve s t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t . W e h a ve t h e
fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s fo r t h e im p le m e n t a t io n o f t h e o p t im a l in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n .
² Disc our aging no invest igat ion.
Th e m a n a g e r h a s t o p r e fe r in ve s t ig a t in g o n e p r o je c t r a t h e r t h a n n o n e a n d n o t in ve s t in g ,
o r in ve s t in g in b o t h . ( In ve s t in g in o n ly o n e is n o t b in d in g .) Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o t h e fo llo win g
in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
E e d1( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ w( 2 I) ( 1 9 )






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 2 0 )
2 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼ + ¼( 1 ¡¼) ) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
³




2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
² Disc our aging invest igat ing t w o pr ojec t s.
Th e m a n a g e r m u s t b e d is c o u r a g e d o f in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s a n d in ve s t in g in n o n e ,
in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a va lu a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a n
u n fa vo r a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g in b o t h p r o je c t s r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a ls . It is o b vio u s t h a t ,
s in c e t h e in ve s t ig a t io n is c o s t ly, t h e m a n a g e r n e ve r in ve s t ig a t e s a p r o je c t t o t h e n m a ke h e r
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n wit h o u t u s in g t h e s ig n a l. Th is r u le s o u t in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a n d n o t in ve s t in g , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a l. W e a r e t h e r e fo r e le ft wit h
t h e fo llo win g t wo in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 2 1 )
³
( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
w( 2 I) ¡ 2 c





w( 2 I) + ( 2 2 )
³








1 3A g a in , we a s s u m e t h a t t h e m a n a g e r h a s lim it e d lia b ilit y, t h a t is , w( zs) ¸ 0 fo r a ll zs.
Th e p r in c ip a l's p r o b le m is t o m in im iz e E e d1( w( zs) ) s u b je c t t o c o n s t r a in t s ( 1 6 ) t o ( 2 2 ) ,
a n d t o lim it e d -lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t s .
P r oposition 2 (i) The optimal wage schedule is characterized by
we d1( R + I) = we d1( I) = we d1( R) = we d1( 0 ) = 0 ;
we d1( 2 I) =
c( ( ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k) ¼2 + 2 ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ¼¼ + ( P2 + k) ¼2)
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( ( P( 1 ¡P) ¡k) ( ( ¼ ¡ ¼) P + ¼) + k( ¼ + ¼) )
;
we d1( 2 R) =
c
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ( ¼ ¡¼) P + ¼) + k( ¼ + ¼) )
:
(ii) The expected wage is
E e d1( we d1( zs) ) =
c( ( 2 ¡ P) ( P2 + k) ¼2 + ( 3 ¡ 2 P) ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ¼¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ( ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k) ¼2) )
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ( ¼ ¡ ¼) P + ¼) + k( ¼ + ¼) )
:
(iii) The principal's expected pro¯t is
¦ ( e d1;k) ¡ E e d1( we d1( zs) ) :
Th e o p t im a l wa g e c o n t r a c t p u n is h e s p r o je c t fa ilu r e s b y s e t t in g we d1( R) = we d1( 0 ) = 0 . Th e r e
a r e o n ly t wo p o s it ive wa g e s : we d1( 2 I) a n d we d1( 2 R) . Th e in t u it io n fo r t h e p r o o f is t o id e n t ify
t h e t wo b in d in g c o n s t r a in t s , n a m e ly c o n s t r a in t s ( 1 9 ) a n d ( 2 0 ) , a n d t h e n s h o w t h a t a ll o t h e r
c o n s t r a in t s a r e s a t is ¯ e d wh e n t h e s e t wo a r e . A ft e r s o lvin g fo r t h e o p t im a l wa g e , we c o m p u t e
t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t a n d t h e p r in c ip a l's p a yo ®. It is e a s y t o s h o w t h a t t h e c o e ± c ie n t
o f c in E e d1( we d1( zs) ) is g r e a t e r t h a n o n e , t h e r e fo r e im p lyin g t h a t t h e m a n a g e r e a r n s s o m e
in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s .
4.1.3 I mplementation of the str ategy e d2
Th e p r in c ip a l wa n t s t o m in im iz e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t s t o t h e m a n a g e r s u b je c t t o h e r
p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t a n d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s d e s ig n e d t o in d u c e t h e m a n a g e r in c h o o s in g
s t r a t e g y e d2. U n d e r s t r a t e g y e d2, t h e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s o n ly o n e p r o je c t , m a ke s a n o p t im a l
1 4in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n in t h a t p r o je c t , a n d a lwa ys in ve s t s in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . Th e
e xp e c t e d wa g e is










( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) ) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
( P( 1 ¡P) ¡k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) + ( ( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) :
N o t e t h a t t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n w( 2 I) a s s t r a t e g y e d2 n e ve r p r e s c r ib e s t o
a b s t a in fr o m in ve s t in g . S e t t in g it t o z e r o is t h e r e fo r e o p t im a l. W e n o w d e s c r ib e a ll c o n s t r a in t s
t h a t m u s t b e im p o s e d o n t h e o p t im a l wa g e s c h e d u le fo r a c o n t r a c t t o im p le m e n t s t r a t e g y
e d2. Fir s t , t h e m a n a g e r 's p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t m u s t b e s a t is ¯ e d .
E e d2( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ 0 ( 2 3 )
S e c o n d t h e m a n a g e r m u s t m a ke t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n c o n d it io n a l o n t h e s ig n a l
s h e o b t a in s fr o m h e r in ve s t ig a t io n . Th e r e a r e t wo p o s s ib le s ig n a ls : ¼ a n d ¼.
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . Th is s h o u ld
b e p r e fe r r e d t o n o t in ve s t a t a ll, in ve s t o n ly in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , o r in ve s t o n ly in t h e
n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . S in c e w( 2 I) = 0 , t h e ¯ r s t c o n s t r a in t is n o t b in d in g . Th is t r a n s la t e s













( 1 ¡ ¼) +
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
P
( 1 ¡ ¼)
!









( ¼w( 2 R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) ) + ( 2 5 )
Ã
P 2 + k
P
( 1 ¡ ¼) +
P( 1 ¡P) ¡ k
P
( 1 ¡ ¼)
!
( ¼w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) ¸
P 2 + k
P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡¼) w( I) )
1 5² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is n o t fa vo r a b le , t h e o p t im a l s t r a t e g y c a lls fo r t h e m a n a g e r t o in ve s t
o n ly in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . Th is s h o u ld b e p r e fe r r e d t o n o t in ve s t a t a ll, t o o n ly
in ve s t in t h e b a d p r o je c t , o r t o in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . A g a in , t h e ¯ r s t c o n s t r a in t is n o t
b in d in g . W e t h e n h a ve t h e fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k
1 ¡ P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) ¸ ( 2 6 )
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
+




( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) )
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k
1 ¡ P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) ¸ ( 2 7 )
¼
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
¼ +





w( 2 R) +
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼ + ( 1 ¡¼) ¼) + 2
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡P
( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼)
!
w( R) +
( 1 ¡ ¼)
Ã
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( 1 ¡ ¼) +
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
( 1 ¡ ¼)
!
w( 0 )
Th ir d , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in in ve s t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t . W e h a ve t h e
fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s fo r t h e im p le m e n t a t io n o f t h e o p t im a l in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n .
² Disc our aging no invest igat ion.
Th e m a n a g e r h a s t o p r e fe r in ve s t ig a t in g o n e p r o je c t r a t h e r t h a n n o n e a n d in ve s t in g in
o n e o f t h e p r o je c t s , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h . ( N o t in ve s t in g is n o t b in d in g .) Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o
t h e fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
E e d2( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ ( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼) w( R + I) + ( P( 1 ¡¼) + ( 1 ¡ P) ( 1 ¡ ¼) ) w( I) ( 2 8 )






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 2 9 )
2 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼¼w( 2 R) + ( ( 1 ¡ ¼) ¼ + ¼( 1 ¡¼) ) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( 0 ) ) +
³




2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
1 6² Disc our aging invest igat ing t w o pr ojec t s.
Th e m a n a g e r m u s t b e d is c o u r a g e d o f in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s a n d in ve s t in g in n o n e ,
in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a va lu a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a n
u n fa vo r a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g in b o t h p r o je c t s r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a ls . It is o b vio u s t h a t ,
s in c e t h e in ve s t ig a t io n is c o s t ly, t h e m a n a g e r n e ve r in ve s t ig a t e s a p r o je c t t o t h e n m a ke h e r
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n wit h o u t u s in g t h e s ig n a l. Th is r u le s o u t in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a n d n o t in ve s t in g , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a l. W e a r e t h e r e fo r e le ft wit h
t h e fo llo win g t wo in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .






2w( 2 R) + 2 ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) w( R) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2w( 0 )
´
+ ( 3 0 )
2 ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) ¡2 c
E e d2( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ 2 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡¼) w( I) ) + ( 3 1 )
³








A g a in , we a s s u m e t h a t t h e m a n a g e r h a s lim it e d lia b ilit y, t h a t is , w( zs) ¸ 0 fo r a ll zs.
Th e p r in c ip a l's p r o b le m is t o m in im iz e E e d2( w( zs) ) s u b je c t t o c o n s t r a in t s ( 2 3 ) t o ( 3 1 ) ,
a n d t o lim it e d -lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t s .
P r oposition 3 (i) If 0 · k < P( 1 ¡P) , the optimal wage schedule is
we d2( R) = we d2( 0 ) = we d2( 2 I) = 0 ;
we d2( I) = we d2( R + I) =
c( A¼2 + 2 B¼¼ + C¼2)
( ¼ ¡¼) ( A( 1 ¡ P) ¼ + CP¼)
;
we d2( 2 R) =
c
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( A( 1 ¡ P) ¼ + CP¼)
;
the expected wage is
E e d2( we d2( zs) ) =
c( A¼2 + B¼¼ + ( 1 ¡P) ( A¼2 + 2 B¼¼ + C¼2) )
( ¼ ¡ ¼) ( A( 1 ¡ P) ¼ + CP¼)
;
1 7where A = P2 + k, B = P( 1 ¡ P) , and C = ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k.
(ii) If k = P( 1 ¡P) , the optimal wage schedule is
we d2( R) = we d2( 0 ) = we d2( 2 I) = we d2( R + I) = 0 ;
we d2( I) =
c( P¼2 + ( 1 ¡P) ¼2)
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) ¡¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) )
;
we d2( 2 R) =
c( P( 1 ¡ ¼) + ( 1 ¡ P) ( 1 ¡¼) )
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) ¡ ¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) )
;
the expected wage is
E e d2( we d2( zs) ) =
c( P2¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) + 2 P( 1 ¡P) ¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) + ( 1 ¡ P) 2¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) )
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼2( 1 ¡¼) ¡ ¼2( 1 ¡ ¼) )
;
(iii) The principal's expected pro¯t is
¦ ( e d2;k) ¡ E e d2( we d2( zs) ) :
It t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e s o lu t io n d i®e r s d e p e n d in g o n t h e va lu e o f k. Th e c o n s t r a in t s e t is
n o t c o n t in u o u s a t k = P( 1 ¡ P) . Co n s t r a in t ( 2 6 ) va n is h e s a s c o r r e la t io n b e c o m e s p e r fe c t .
S in c e t h is c o n s t r a in t is b in d in g fo r lo we r va lu e s o f k, t h e s o lu t io n ju m p s d is c o n t in u o u s ly a t
k = P( 1 ¡P) . W h e n k < P( 1 ¡P) , o n ly c o n s t r a in t s ( 2 6 ) , ( 2 8 ) , a n d ( 2 9 ) b in d . Th e o p t im a l
wa g e c o n t r a c t p u n is h e s p r o je c t fa ilu r e s wh e n t wo p r o je c t s h a ve b e e n in ve s t e d in b y s e t t in g
we d2( R) = we d2( 0 ) = 0 . Th is d is c o u r a g e s t h e m a n a g e r fr o m in ve s t in g b lin d ly in b o t h p r o je c t s
r a t h e r t h a n in ve s t ig a t in g o n e . Th e r e r e m a in t h r e e p o s it ive wa g e s : we d2( I) , we d2( R + I) , a n d
we d2( 2 R) . A ¯ r s t r e s u lt is t h a t we d2( I) = we d2( R + I) . Th is c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d b y lo o kin g a t
c o n s t r a in t ( 2 6 ) . Th is c o n s t r a in t s im p li¯ e s t o
B( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡¼) w( I) ) ¸ B( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) :
W h e n k < P( 1 ¡ P) , B > 0 . Th e c o n s t r a in t t h e n im p lie s t h a t we d2( I) = we d2( R + I) . In t u -
it ive ly, c o n s t r a in t ( 2 6 ) s a ys t h a t , wh e n t h e s ig n a l is ¼, t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld p r e fe r in ve s t in g
in t h e u n kn o wn n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , r a t h e r t h a n in ve s t in g in t h e b a d in ve s t ig a t e d o n e .
Th is im p lie s t h a t s u c c e s s m u s t b e r e wa r d e d , i.e ., we d2( R+I) ¸ we d2( I) . B u t t h is is in c o m p a t i-
b le wit h p r o vid in g in c e n t ive s fo r in ve s t ig a t in g ( c o n s t r a in t s ( 2 8 ) a n d ( 2 9 ) ) . Th e s e c o n s t r a in t s
1 8a r e r e la xe d if w( R + I) is lo w. Th e t r a d e o ® b e t we e n t h e s e c o n s t r a in t s is t h e n t o s e t t h e
t wo wa g e s e qu a l. A n o t h e r in t e r p r e t a t io n is t h a t , s in c e t h e m a n a g e r is fo r c e d t o in ve s t in t h e
n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , it is n o t o p t im a l t o p u n is h h e r fo r fa ilu r e wh e n s h e in ve s t s o n ly in
t h a t p r o je c t , h e n c e , we d2( I) = we d2( R + I) . W h e n k = P( 1 ¡ P) , c o n s t r a in t ( 2 6 ) va n is h e s ,
a n d o n ly c o n s t r a in t s ( 2 8 ) a n d ( 2 9 ) b in d . Th e s o lu t io n p r e s c r ib e s t o s e t we d2( R + I) = 0 .
A ft e r s o lvin g fo r t h e o p t im a l wa g e , we c o m p u t e t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t a n d t h e
p r in c ip a l's p a yo ®. It is e a s y t o s h o w t h a t t h e c o e ± c ie n t o f c in E e d2( we d2( zs) ) is g r e a t e r t h a n
o n e , t h e r e fo r e im p lyin g t h a t t h e m a n a g e r e a r n s s o m e in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s .
4.1.4 I mplementation of the str ategy e d3
Th e p r in c ip a l wa n t s t o m in im iz e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t s t o t h e m a n a g e r s u b je c t t o h e r
p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t a n d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s d e s ig n e d t o in d u c e t h e m a n a g e r in c h o o s in g
s t r a t e g y e d3. U n d e r s t r a t e g y e d3, t h e m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s o n ly o n e p r o je c t , m a ke s a n o p t im a l
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n in t h a t p r o je c t , a n d n e ve r in ve s t s in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t . Th e
e xp e c t e d wa g e is
E e d3( w( zs) ) ´ P( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) + ( 1 ¡P) w( 2 I) :
Th e e xp e c t e d wa g e is in d e p e n d e n t o f w( 2 R) , w( R) , a n d w( 0 ) . Th is im p lie s t h a t s e t t in g t h e m
t o z e r o r e la xe s t h e in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s . In t h e fo llo win g , we c a n t h e r e fo r e s e t t h e m t o z e r o .
W e n o w d e s c r ib e a ll c o n s t r a in t s t h a t m u s t b e im p o s e d o n t h e o p t im a l wa g e s c h e d u le fo r a
c o n t r a c t t o im p le m e n t s t r a t e g y e d3. Fir s t , t h e m a n a g e r 's p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t m u s t b e
s a t is ¯ e d .
E e d3( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ 0 ( 3 2 )
S e c o n d t h e m a n a g e r m u s t m a ke t h e e ± c ie n t in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n c o n d it io n a l o n t h e s ig n a l
s h e o b t a in s fr o m h e r in ve s t ig a t io n . Th e r e a r e t wo p o s s ib le s ig n a ls : ¼ a n d ¼.
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld in ve s t o n ly in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t .
Th is s h o u ld b e p r e fe r r e d t o n o t in ve s t a t a ll, in ve s t o n ly in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , o r
1 9in ve s t in b o t h . S in c e in ve s t in g in b o t h yie ld s z e r o , t h is c o n s t r a in t is n e ve r b in d in g , a n d is
t h e r e fo r e o m it t e d . W e h a ve t h e fo llo win g t wo in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ¸ w( 2 I) ( 3 3 )
¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ¸ ( 3 4 )
P 2 + k
P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ) +
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
P
( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡¼) w( I) )
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is n o t fa vo r a b le , t h e o p t im a l s t r a t e g y c a lls fo r t h e m a n a g e r n o t t o in ve s t
a t a ll. Th is s h o u ld b e p r e fe r r e d t o o n ly in ve s t in t h e in ve s t ig a t e d p r o je c t , t o in ve s t o n ly
in t h e n o n in ve s t ig a t e d o n e , o r t o in ve s t in b o t h p r o je c t s . A g a in t h is la s t p o s s ib ilit y yie ld s
z e r o , a n d it s a s s o c ia t e d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t is o m it t e d . W e t h e n h a ve t h e fo llo win g in c e n t ive
c o n s t r a in t s .
w( 2 I) ¸ ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) w( I) ( 3 5 )
w( 2 I) ¸
Ã








w( R + I) + ( 3 6 )
Ã
P ( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( 1 ¡ ¼) +





Th ir d , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in in ve s t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t . W e h a ve t h e
fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s fo r t h e im p le m e n t a t io n o f t h e o p t im a l in ve s t ig a t io n d e c is io n .
² Disc our aging no invest igat ion.
Th e m a n a g e r h a s t o p r e fe r in ve s t ig a t in g o n e p r o je c t r a t h e r t h a n n o n e a n d n o t in ve s t in g ,
in ve s t in g in o n e o f t h e p r o je c t s , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h . A g a in t h is la s t c o n s t r a in t is o m it t e d .
Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o t h e fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .
E e d3( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ w( 2 I) ( 3 7 )
E e d3( w( zs) ) ¡ c ¸ ( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼) w( R + I) + ( P( 1 ¡¼) + ( 1 ¡ P) ( 1 ¡ ¼) ) w( I) ( 3 8 )
2 0² Disc our aging invest igat ing t w o pr ojec t s.
Th e m a n a g e r m u s t b e d is c o u r a g e d o f in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s a n d in ve s t in g in n o n e ,
in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a va lu a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g o n ly in t h e p r o je c t s wit h a n
u n fa vo r a b le s ig n a l, in ve s t in g in b o t h p r o je c t s r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a ls . It is o b vio u s t h a t ,
s in c e t h e in ve s t ig a t io n is c o s t ly, t h e m a n a g e r n e ve r in ve s t ig a t e s a p r o je c t t o t h e n m a ke h e r
in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n wit h o u t u s in g t h e s ig n a l. Th is r u le s o u t in ve s t ig a t in g t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a n d n o t in ve s t in g , o r in ve s t in g in b o t h r e g a r d le s s o f t h e s ig n a l. W e a r e t h e r e fo r e le ft wit h
t h e fo llo win g t wo in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .





w( 2 I) ¡2 c ( 3 9 )





w( 2 I) + 2 ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼w( R + I) + ( 1 ¡¼) w( I) ) ¡ 2 c ( 4 0 )
A g a in , we a s s u m e t h a t t h e m a n a g e r h a s lim it e d lia b ilit y, t h a t is , w( zs) ¸ 0 fo r a ll zs.
Th e p r in c ip a l's p r o b le m is t o m in im iz e E e d3( w( zs) ) s u b je c t t o c o n s t r a in t s ( 3 2 ) t o ( 4 0 ) ,
a n d t o lim it e d -lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t s .
P r oposition 4 (i) The optimal wage schedule is
we d3( 2 R) = we d3( R) = we d3( 0 ) = we d3( I) = 0 ;
we d3( R + I) =
c
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼ ¡ ¼)
;
we d3( 2 I) =
c( P¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼)
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼ ¡ ¼)
;
the expected wage is
E e d3( we d3( zs) ) =
c( P¼ + P( 1 ¡ P) ¼ + ( 1 ¡ P) 2¼)
P( 1 ¡ P) ( ¼ ¡ ¼)
:
(ii) The principal's expected pro¯t is
¦ ( e d3;k) ¡ E e d3( we d3( zs) ) :
2 1In ve s t in g in b o t h p r o je c t s is p u n is h e d , a n d fa ilu r e o n t h e u n d e r t a ke n p r o je c t is a ls o p u n is h e d .
Th is le a ve s o n ly t wo p o s it ive wa g e s , we d3( 2 I) a n d we d3( R+I) . On ly c o n s t r a in t s ( 3 7 ) a n d ( 3 8 )
b in d , a n d o p t im a l wa g e s a r e c o m p u t e d s o lvin g fo r t h e s e t wo b in d in g c o n s t r a in t s . N o t e t h a t
t h e s o lu t io n is c o m p le t e ly in d e p e n d e n t o f k s in c e n o n e o f t h e c o n s t r a in t s wh e r e k a p p e a r s is
b in d in g . A ft e r s o lvin g fo r t h e o p t im a l wa g e , we c o m p u t e t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t a n d
t h e p r in c ip a l's p a yo ®. It is e a s y t o s h o w t h a t t h e c o e ± c ie n t o f c in E e d2( we d2( zs) ) is g r e a t e r
t h a n o n e , t h e r e fo r e im p lyin g t h a t t h e m a n a g e r e a r n s s o m e in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s .
4.2 H ir ing two manager s
W e n o w in t r o d u c e a d i®e r e n t fo r m o f o r g a n iz a t io n a l s t r u c t u r e wh e r e e a c h p r o je c t is u n d e r
t h e r e s p o n s ib ilit y o f a s in g le m a n a g e r . W e a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e t u r n s o n b o t h p r o je c t s a r e
o b s e r va b le s o t h a t t h e c o m p e n s a t io n o f e a c h m a n a g e r c a n d e p e n d o n t h e r e t u r n s o f b o t h
p r o je c t s . Th is a m o u n t s t o u s in g r e la t ive -p e r fo r m a n c e c o m p e n s a t io n t o s t im u la t e a fo r m o f
c o m p e t it io n b e t we e n t h e t wo m a n a g e r s . Fo r e xa m p le , m a n a g e r 1 's c o m p e n s a t io n is d e n o t e d
b y w1( r1;r2) , wh e r e ri is t h e r e t u r n o n p r o je c t i, a n d ri 2 f0 ;R;Ig.
E a c h m a n a g e r m u s t m a ke in ve s t ig a t io n a n d in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n s , wit h o u t kn o win g wh a t
t h e o t h e r m a n a g e r d o e s o r o b s e r ve s , n a m e ly, m a n a g e r i c a n n o t o b s e r ve t h e in ve s t ig a t io n
d e c is io n o f m a n a g e r j, t h e s ig n a l m a n a g e r j o b t a in s , o r h e r in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n . W e a ls o
a s s u m e t h a t t h e t wo m a n a g e r s c a n n o t c o m m u n ic a t e p r io r t o in ve s t ig a t io n o r in ve s t m e n t ,
t h e r e fo r e r u lin g o u t a n y p o s s ib ilit y fo r c o llu s io n .
Th e ¯ r s t -b e s t s t r a t e g y fr o m t h e p o in t o f vie w o f t h e p r in c ip a l is t o in ve s t ig a t e e a c h p r o je c t
a n d o n ly in ve s t in t h o s e wit h a fa vo r a b le s ig n a l, t h a t is s t r a t e g y b d. U n d e r s u c h s t r a t e g y, t h e
e xp e c t e d wa g e is
E b d( wi( ri;rj) ) ´ ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) +
( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡ k) ( ¼wi( Ri;Ij) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Ij) ) +
³









2wi( Ri;Rj) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ri;0 ) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2wi( 0 ;0 )
´
:
Th e p r in c ip a l m u s t d e s ig n wa g e s c h e d u le s fo r e a c h m a n a g e r s o t h a t t h e y h a ve in c e n t ive s t o
fo llo w s u c h s t r a t e g y. W a g e s m u s t t h e n s a t is fy t h e fo llo win g c o n s t r a in t s .
2 2Fir s t , e a c h m a n a g e r m u s t ¯ n d h e r c o n t r a c t a c c e p t a b le . Fo r i;j = 1 ;2 , we h a ve t h e
fo llo win g p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t .
E b d( wi( ri;rj) ) ¡ c ¸ 0 ( 4 1 )
S e c o n d , e a c h m a n a g e r m u s t in ve s t e ± c ie n t ly c o n d it io n a l o n t h e s ig n a l s h e r e c e ive s .
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r s h o u ld in ve s t in t h e p r o je c t r a t h e r t h a n a b -




( ¼wi( Ri;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ri;0 ) ) + ¼
P( 1 ¡P) ¡k
P
wi( Ri;Ij) + ( 4 2 )
( 1 ¡ ¼)
P2 + k
P
( ¼wi( 0 ;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;0 ) ) + ( 1 ¡¼)
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k
P
wi( 0 ;Ij) ¸
P2 + k
P
( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) +
P( 1 ¡P) ¡ k
P
wi( Ii;Ij)
N o t e t h a t m a n a g e r i u s e s h e r s ig n a l t o u p d a t e t h e d is t r ib u t io n o f s ig n a ls o f t h e o t h e r m a n a g e r .
Ma n a g e r i a ls o a s s u m e s t h a t m a n a g e r j fo llo ws t h e p r e s c r ib e d s t r a t e g y.
² T he signal on t he invest igat ed pr ojec t is ¼.
W h e n t h e s ig n a l is n o t fa vo r a b le , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in n o t in ve s t in g .
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k
1 ¡ P
( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) +
( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
wi( Ii;Ij) ¸ ( 4 3 )
P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k
1 ¡ P
( ¼( ¼wi( Ri;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Rj) ) + ( 1 ¡¼) ( ¼wi( Ri;0 ) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;0 ) ) ) +
( 1 ¡P) 2 + k
1 ¡ P
( ¼wi( Ri;Ij) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Ij) )
Th ir d , t h e m a n a g e r m u s t b e in d u c e d in in ve s t ig a t in g o n e p r o je c t a n d in ve s t in g o p t im a lly
r a t h e r t h a n n o t in ve s t ig a t in g a n d n o t in ve s t in g , o r in ve s t in g b lin d ly. Th is t r a n s la t e s in t o t h e
fo llo win g in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s .





( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) +
³




( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) + wi( Ii;Ij) )






2wi( Ri;Rj) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) ( wi( Ri;0 ) + wi( 0 ;Rj) ) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)
2wi( 0 ;0 )
´
+ ( 4 4 )





( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) + ( ( 1 ¡ P) P ¡k) wi( Ii;Ij) :
Th e s e c o n d in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t is :
E b d( wi( ri;rj) ) ¡ c ¸ ( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ( 1 ¡¼) ¼wi( 0 ;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;0 ) ) +






2wi( Ri;Rj) + ¼( 1 ¡ ¼) ( wi( Ri;0 ) + wi( 0 ;Rj) ) + ( 1 ¡ ¼)




( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
( ¼wi( Ri;Ij) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Ij) ) :
W e c a n s im p lify it t o :
( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ¼wi( Ii;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ii;0 ) ) +
³
( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
wi( Ii;Ij) ¡c ¸ ( 4 5 )
( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡k) ( ¼( ¼wi( Ri;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ri;0 ) ) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) ( ¼wi( 0 ;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;0 ) ) ) +
³
( 1 ¡ P)
2 + k
´
( ¼wi( Ri;Ij) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( 0 ;Ij) ) :
L im it e d lia b ilit y c o n s t r a in t s a r e wi( ri;rj) ¸ 0 fo r a ll ri a n d rj.
Fo r i;j = 1 ;2 , t h e p r in c ip a l's p r o b le m is t o m in im iz e E b d( wi( ri;rj) ) s u b je c t t o c o n s t r a in t s
( 4 1 ) t o ( 4 5 ) . W e n o t e t h a t t h e p a r t ic ip a t io n c o n s t r a in t ( 4 1 ) is s a t is ¯ e d wh e n c o n s t r a in t ( 4 4 )
is , a n d t h a t c o n s t r a in t s ( 4 2 ) a n d ( 4 3 ) a r e s a t is ¯ e d wh e n c o n s t r a in t s ( 4 4 ) a n d ( 4 5 ) a r e . W e
a r e t h e r e fo r e le ft wit h o n ly t wo c o n s t r a in t s , ( 4 4 ) a n d ( 4 5 ) .
P r oposition 5 F or i;j = 1 ;2 , the optimal wage schedule is characterized by
wib d( 0 ;Ij) = wib d( 0 ;Rj) = wib d( 0 ;0 ) = wib d( Ri;0 ) = wib d( Ii;0 ) = wib d( Ii;Rj) = wib d( Ri;Ij) = 0 ;
wib d( Ri;Rj) =
c( 1 ¡ P)
¼ ( ¼( P2 + k) ( ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k) ¡ ¼( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) 2)
;
2 4and
wib d( Ii;Ij) =
c( ¼( P2 + k) + ¼( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) )
¼( P2 + k) ( ( 1 ¡P) 2 + k) ¡ ¼( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) 2:
The expected wage payment to manager i is
E b d( wib d( ri;rj) ) =
c( ¼( P2 + k) ( ( 1 ¡ P) ( 2 ¡ P) + k) + ¼( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) ( ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k) )
¼( P2 + k) ( ( 1 ¡ P) 2 + k) ¡ ¼( P( 1 ¡ P) ¡ k) 2 :
The expected pro¯t is
¦ ( b d;k) ¡2 E b d( wib d( ri;rj) ) :
P r o je c t fa ilu r e s a r e p e n a liz e d t o g ive in c e n t ive s t o t h e m a n a g e r t o in ve s t o p t im a lly. Th is
is o p t im a l s in c e b a d p r o je c t s h a ve a h ig h e r p r o b a b ilit y o f fa ilu r e t h a n g o o d p r o je c t s . Th e
wa g e wib d( Ri;0 ) is a ls o s e t t o z e r o . Th is is n o t n e c e s s a r y fo r a n o p t im a l wa g e s c h e d u le b u t
is wit h o u t lo s s o f g e n e r a lit y. Ma n a g e r i h a s n o c o n t r o l o ve r m a n a g e r j's p r o je c t . H e r p a yo ®
o n ly d e p e n d s o n ¼wi( Ri;Rj) + ( 1 ¡ ¼) wi( Ri;0 ) . Th e r e is n o lo s s o f g e n e r a lit y in s e t t in g
wib d( Ri;0 ) t o z e r o . Th e wa g e s wib d( Ii;Rj) = wib d( Ri;Ij) = wib d( Ii;0 ) = 0 b e c a u s e it is o p t im a l
t o p u n is h m a n a g e r s t h a t h a ve c o r r e la t e d in fo r m a t io n a n d t h a t in ve s t d i®e r e n t ly. In c e n t ive s
a r e m o r e p o we r fu l wh e n o n ly wib d( Ri;Rj) a n d wib d( Ii;Ij) a r e p o s it ive . ( N o t e t h a t o n ly t wo
wa g e s n e e d t o b e p o s it ive a s o n ly t wo c o n s t r a in t s b in d .) S o lvin g fo r t h e t wo c o n s t r a in t s ( 4 4 )
a n d ( 4 5 ) yie ld s t h e c lo s e d -fo r m s o lu t io n fo r t h e t wo r e m a in in g wa g e s . W e c a n t h e n c a lc u la t e
t h e e xp e c t e d wa g e p a ym e n t t o m a n a g e r i. A s b e fo r e , t h e c o e ± c ie n t o f c in E b d( wib d( ri;rj) ) is
g r e a t e r t h a n o n e , im p lyin g t h a t t h e m a n a g e r e a r n s s o m e in fo r m a t io n a l r e n t s .
5 Compar ison of the di®er ent str uctur es
It is h a r d t o c o m p a r e t h e d i®e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s b e c a u s e t h e c a s e in wh ic h o n e m a n a g e r in ve s t i-
g a t e t wo p r o je c t s c a n n o t b e fu lly c h a r a c t e r iz e d . W e d o , h o we ve r , h a ve s o m e lim it in g r e s u lt s
a r o u n d k = 0 a n d k = P( 1 ¡ P) . W e c a n a ls o c o m p a r e t h e c la s s o f s t r a t e g ie s wh e n o n e
m a n a g e r in ve s t ig a t e s o n e p r o je c t .
P r oposition 6 (i) W hen the correlation between projects is weak enough (k near 0) and I
is close to P¼R + ( 1 ¡P) ¼R, it is always optimal to use only one manager and having her
2 5investigate the two projects. If I is small (large) relative to P¼R + ( 1 ¡ P) ¼R, it may be
optimal to investigate one project and always (never) invest in the noninvestigated project.
(ii) W hen the correlation between projects is strong enough (k near P( 1 ¡P) ), it is optimal
to use two managers and relative-performance compensation schemes if and only if
P( 3 P ¡2 ) ( ¼
2 ¡ ¼
2) + ¼
2 > 0 ;
otherwise, it is optimal to use one manager and investigate only one project.
W h e n p r o je c t s a r e we a kly c o r r e la t e d a n d I is c lo s e t o P¼R+( 1 ¡P) ¼R, it is a lwa ys o p t im a l
t o u s e o n ly o n e m a n a g e r a n d h a vin g h e r in ve s t ig a t e t h e t wo p r o je c t s . Th e r e a s o n t h is
d o m in a t e s h ir in g t wo m a n a g e r s is t h a t t h e r e a r e in fo r m a t io n a l e c o n o m ie s o f s c a le . Th e r e
is m o r e r o o m t o p u n is h a m a n a g e r wh e n s h e m a n a g e s t wo p r o je c t s , a n d t h e r e fo r e in c e n t ive
c o n s t r a in t s a r e r e la xe d c o m p a r e d t o t h e c a s e wh e r e t h e r e a r e t wo m a n a g e r s . Th is im p lie s
t h a t t h e r e a r e in fo r m a t io n a l e c o n o m ie s o f s c a le in t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f p r o je c t s . A n o t h e r
im p lic a t io n o f t h is is t h a t o n e m a n a g e r d o m in a t e s t wo m a n a g e r s n e a r k = 0 fo r a n y va lu e o f
I a n d P¼R + ( 1 ¡P) ¼R. R e la t ive -p e r fo r m a n c e s c h e m e s c a n o n ly b e o p t im a l if p r o je c t s a r e
s u ± c ie n t ly c o r r e la t e d .
W h e n t h e c o r r e la t io n is s t r o n g ( k n e a r P( 1 ¡ P) ) , h ir in g t wo m a n a g e r s is o p t im a l if
¼ is la r g e e n o u g h . Th e in t u it io n fo r t h is is t h e fo llo win g . N e a r p e r fe c t c o r r e la t io n , h ir in g
o n e m a n a g e r t h a t in ve s t ig a t e s o n e p r o je c t a n d m a ke s t h e s a m e in ve s t m e n t d e c is io n o n b o t h
p r o je c t s d o m in a t e s a ll o t h e r s t r a t e g ie s u s in g o n ly o n e m a n a g e r . W h e n t h is s t r a t e g y is c o m -
p a r e d t o h ir in g t wo m a n a g e r s , t h e p a r a m e t e r ¼ is im p o r t a n t . W h e n t h e s ig n a l is ¼, t h e
s in g le m a n a g e r d o e s n o t in ve s t . W h e n ¼ is lo w, h e r in c e n t ive c o n s t r a in t s a r e t h e n r e la xe d
a s it is e a s y t o p r o vid e r h e r wit h in c e n t ive s n o t t o in ve s t . W h e n ¼ is la r g e , t h e t wo p r o je c t s
a r e s im ila r , a n d it b e c o m e s m o r e c o s t ly t o p r o vid e in c e n t ive s t o t h e s in g le m a n a g e r . W h e n
t h e r e a r e t wo m a n a g e r s c o m p e t in g , it is n o t t h e d i®e r e n c e in t h e qu a lit y o f t h e p r o je c t s t h a t
m a t t e r , b u t r a t h e r h a vin g t h e s a m e in ve s t m e n t s t r a t e g y a s t h e o t h e r m a n a g e r . Th is im p lie s
t h a t va r ia t io n s in ¼ d o n o t a ®e c t t h e e ± c ie n c y o f h a vin g t wo m a n a g e r s a s m u c h a s t h a t o f
o n ly o n e m a n a g e r .
2 66 Conclusion
Th is p a p e r s h o ws t h a t a n y s t r u c t u r e c a n b e o p t im a l d e p e n d in g o n p a r a m e t e r va lu e s . R e la t ive -
p e r fo r m a n c e in c e n t ive s m a y b e o p t im a l wh e n t h e c o r r e la t io n b e t we e n p r o je c t s is la r g e e n o u g h
a n d t h e d i®e r e n c e in t h e qu a lit y o f t h e p r o je c t s is la r g e e n o u g h . Th is im p lie s t h a t it is n o t
n e c e s s a r ily o p t im a l t o e xp lo it in fo r m a t io n a l e c o n o m ie s o f s c a le : t h e r e a r e c a s e s wh e r e in ve s -
t ig a t in g o n ly o n e p r o je c t is n e ve r o p t im a l.
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